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a b s t r a c t 
In this paper, we study supplier development in a decentralized supply chain with a single manufacturer 
and a single supplier. Because supplier development usually requires relationship-speciﬁc investments, 
the allocation of investment costs is a critical issue faced by participating ﬁrms. Referencing the relational 
view, we ﬁrst investigate the effects of relationship-speciﬁc investments on the eﬃciency and effective- 
ness of supplier development. Next, we formulate and solve a continuous time optimal control model 
characterizing the decision to invest in supplier development and show that the supplier’s incentive to 
participate in supplier development critically depends on the manufacturer’s share of investment costs. 
The ﬁndings of our numerical analysis indicate that although the subsidy can lead to signiﬁcant improve- 
ment in supply chain performance, subsidizing a constant share of investment costs is not always eco- 
nomically reasonable from the manufacturer’s point of view. Thus, we provide a negotiation-based algo- 
rithm that assists the manufacturing ﬁrm in gradually increasing the share of investment costs to ensure 
an eﬃcient level of subsidy, resulting in both perfect supply chain coordination and a win–win situation. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B  
a
 
b  
t  
p  
p  
a  
a  
m  
(  
e  
n  
s
 
f  
t  
a  1. Introduction 
Because manufacturing ﬁrms increasingly focus on their core
competencies, capable supplier networks play a paramount role
in generating competitive advantage. However, suppliers too often
lack the capability to perform adequately. In response, manufactur-
ers across a wide range of industries develop closer relationships
with their suppliers and initiate supplier development programs
( Wagner, 2010 ). Within the automotive industry, Toyota initially
began providing on-site assistance to help supplying ﬁrms imple-
ment lean manufacturing concepts for technological and organiza-
tional changes ( Marksberry, 2012; Sako, 2004 ). Other automobile
manufacturers have followed this collaborative approach to im-
prove supply chain performance, including Chrysler, Daimler, Ford,
General Motors, Honda, Nissan, and Volkswagen ( Praxmarer-Carus,
Sucky, & Durst, 2013; Talluri, Narasimhan, & Chung, 2010 ). Further
examples of supplier development programs applied by companies
outside the automotive industry can be found, among others, at∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 921556195; fax: +49 921556192. 
E-mail addresses: michael.proch@uni-bayreuth.de (M. Proch), karl.worthmann@ 
tu-ilmenau.de (K. Worthmann), j.schluechtermann@uni-bayreuth.de 
(J. Schlüchtermann). 
t  
v  
R  
m  
i  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.06.029 
0377-2217/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uoeing, Dell, General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, Siemens,
nd Walmart ( Routroy & Pradhan, 2013; Wagner, 2006a ). 
Supplier development is broadly deﬁned as “any effort by a
uying ﬁrm to improve a supplier’s performance and/or capabili-
ies to meet the manufacturing ﬁrm’s short- and/or long-term sup-
ly needs” ( Krause, 1999 , p. 206). Following this deﬁnition, sup-
lier development activities are typically initiated, designed, and
dministered by the manufacturing ﬁrm. Moreover, it is usually
ssumed that suppliers are eagerly willing to adapt and imple-
ent supplier development activities imposed by the manufacturer
 Mortensen & Arlbjørn, 2012 ). However, despite the potential ben-
ﬁts resulting from such participation, supplier development may
ot always be a paying proposition for the supplier ( Kim & Netes-
ine, 2013; Krause, Handﬁeld, & Tyler, 2007 ). 
Indeed, there are sound arguments why suppliers might refrain
rom joining in supplier development. Because resources commit-
ed to supplier development are most often relationship-speciﬁc
nd therefore diﬃcult or even impossible to redeploy outside
he particular business relationship, suppliers may see such in-
estments as vulnerable to opportunistic expropriation ( Wang, Li,
oss, & Craighead, 2013; Williamson, 1979 ). Therefore, suppliers
ight be reluctant to modify or improve internal processes, and
nstead pursue their own objectives while participating in suppliernder the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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(evelopment ( Bai & Sarkis, 2014 ). Because supplier development is
 reciprocal approach that requires mutual recognition, misaligned
bjectives and the hazards of opportunistic behavior could cause
neﬃciency in or, even worse, the premature abandonment of
he supplier development process ( Blonska, Storey, Rozemeijer,
etzels, & de Ruyter, 2013; Iida, 2012 ). 
Given this background, the purpose of our research is to exam-
ne the alignment of the supply chain partners’ objectives to en-
ance the supplier development process. We seek to answer the
ollowing questions: How does the risk of partner opportunism
ffect the supplier’s willingness to participate in manufacturer-
nitiated supplier development? Are bilateral relationship-speciﬁc
nvestments a viable incentive to induce desirable supplier behav-
or, while simultaneously facilitating value generation within sup-
lier development? Additionally, how should the mutual invest-
ent decision be arranged to improve supply chain coordination,
hile both the supplier and the manufacturer increase their re-
pective proﬁt? 
By answering these questions, our paper makes a threefold con-
ribution. First, in reference to the relational view as a theoretical
ramework, we investigate the effect of relationship-speciﬁc invest-
ents on the eﬃciency and effectiveness of supplier development
nd show that the deployment of bilateral relationship-speciﬁc in-
estments might be an important source of competitive advantage.
econd, considering a decentralized supply chain consisting of one
anufacturer and one supplier, we formulate a continuous time
ptimal control model characterizing the supplier development in-
estment decision. Using this model, we ﬁnd that the supplier’s
ncentive to participate in supplier development critically depends
n the manufacturer’s share of investment costs. We then carry out
n extensive numerical analysis and demonstrate that although the
anufacturer’s subsidy leads to signiﬁcant improvement in sup-
ly chain performance, subsidizing a constant share of investment
osts is not always economically reasonable from the manufactur-
ng ﬁrm’s perspective. Given the fact that for an ongoing collabora-
ive business relationship, supply chain coordination must result in
nhancing the proﬁtability of both the manufacturer and the sup-
lier, we third present a negotiation-based algorithm that assists
he manufacturing ﬁrm in gradually increasing the share of invest-
ent costs to ensure an eﬃcient level of subsidy. The proposed co-
rdination scheme can be employed as a guideline to realize per-
ect supply chain coordination while both the manufacturer and
he supplier increase their respective proﬁt in each iteration, lead-
ng to a win–win situation. 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. First, the
elated literature is brieﬂy reviewed in Section 2 before some the-
retical background on the performance implications of supplier
evelopment is provided in the subsequent Section 3 . Then, the
asic optimal control problem is described in Section 4 before a
eference solution is computed in Section 5 assuming a central-
zed decision-making process. Next, two cases of a decentralized
ecision-making process are considered: indirect supplier develop-
ent in Section 6 and direct supplier development in Section 7 .
ubsequently, a negotiation-based coordination algorithm is pro-
osed and numerically analyzed in Section 8 . Finally, an exten-
ion to a scenario with multiple suppliers is brieﬂy sketched before
onclusions are drawn in Section 9 . 
. Related literature 
The topic of supplier development has received considerable at-
ention from researchers in the past two decades ( Talluri et al.,
010 ). Previous research on supplier development demonstrates
hat manufacturing ﬁrms use a variety of activities to develop
uppliers’ performance and/or capabilities. With few exceptions
e.g., Hartley & Jones, 1997; Sánchez-Rodríguez, Hemsworth, &artínez-Lorente, 2005 ), supplier development activities are classi-
ed by the manufacturer’s level of commitment to a speciﬁc sup-
lier (e.g., Humphreys, Cadden, Wen-Li, & McHugh, 2011; Krause,
997; Krause, Scannell, & Calantone, 20 0 0; Monczka, Trent, &
allahan, 1993; Wagner, 2006b ). Accordingly, we distinguish two
ypes of supplier development activities in this paper, indirect and
irect supplier development. 
In the case of indirect supplier development, the manufactur-
ng ﬁrm commits no or only limited resources to a speciﬁc sup-
lier. Instead, indirect supplier development may encompass activ-
ties such as evaluating suppliers’ operations, setting performance
oals, providing performance feedback, instilling competitive pres-
ure, promising future business based on goal attainment or rec-
gnizing suppliers’ progress by designating them as preferred sup-
liers ( Krause et al., 20 0 0; Wagner, 2010 ). These activities might
ncourage suppliers to take additional efforts to better comply
ith the manufacturer’s requirements, resulting in unilateral de-
loyment of relationship-speciﬁc investments. 
In contrast to indirect supplier development, the manufacturer
lays a more active role in the case of direct supplier development.
irect supplier development might include activities such as train-
ng given to suppliers’ personnel by manufacturing ﬁrm represen-
atives, furnishing temporary on-site support to enhance further
nteraction, providing equipment and tools, or even dedicating cap-
tal resources to suppliers ( Monczka et al., 1993; Wagner & Krause,
009 ). Thus, direct supplier development presents a more col-
aborative approach based on frequent manufacturer-supplier ex-
hanges, resulting in bilateral deployment of relationship-speciﬁc
nvestments. 
Empirical research generally supports the notion that supplier
evelopment plays a critical role in driving performance and/or
apabilities improvement on the part of the supplier and con-
ributes strategically to strengthen the manufacturer’s competitive-
ess. However, Krause and Ellram (1997) note that manufactur-
rs’ success in supplier development varies and that those who
re more satisﬁed with the outcome of supplier development ac-
ivities appear to communicate more effectively with and invest
ore time and resources in suppliers than do less-satisﬁed compa-
ies. As indicated by Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell (1998) , sup-
liers are unlikely to embrace fully a set of changes required for
mprovement unless there is tangible evidence that the manufac-
uring ﬁrm will support the supplier’s effort s with matched re-
ources. Thus, successful supplier development apparently requires
ilateral deployment of resources, not only inputs from the sup-
lying ﬁrm ( Krause, 1999 ). Similar results are found by Krause
t al. (20 0 0) , Wen-li, Humphreys, Chan, and Kumaraswamy (2003) ,
umphreys, Li, and Chan (2004) , Krause et al. (2007) , Humphreys
t al. (2011) and Wagner (2011) , who all state that direct support
y a manufacturing ﬁrm is of major signiﬁcance in determining
upplier performance and/or capabilities improvement, thus en-
ancing the manufacturer’s competitiveness. 
Although direct involvement by the manufacturing ﬁrm seems
o be an important antecedent of successful supplier develop-
ent, mounting anecdotal evidence indicates that the majority of
anufacturers are generally very hesitant to commit considerable
esources to external, independent suppliers. As Monczka et al.
1993) determine, manufacturers are reluctant to conduct direct
upplier development activities when they fear that competitors
ay beneﬁt from the supplier’s capability improvements. Further-
ore, Krause (1997) reports that relationship-speciﬁc investments
n suppliers’ operations are rarely used compared with indirect
upplier development activities. In line with this, Krause and Scan-
ell (2002) state that manufacturers’ commitment appears to be
on-existent when a need for direct investments arises in the con-
ext of supplier development. Similar results are found by Wagner
2006a) , Carr and Kaynak (2007) , and Wagner and Krause (2009) . 
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s  There also have been some analytical, formal modeling-oriented
studies of supplier development. Using rough set theory, Bai and
Sarkis (2010) introduce a formal model to investigate relationships
between organizational attributes, ﬁrms’ involvement in supplier
development, and performance outcomes. Using interpretative
structural modeling, Govindan, Kannan, and Haq (2010) present
a framework to analyze interactions among several critical suc-
cess factors of supplier development. Furthermore, Talluri et al.
(2010) present a set of optimization models proposed for assist-
ing manufacturers in making optimal resource allocation decisions
among different suppliers while minimizing the level of risk. Based
on a proﬁt-maximizing framework, Friedl and Wagner (2012) study
a manufacturer’s decision regarding whether to develop a deﬁcient
supplier or switch to an alternative source. Routroy and Pradhan
(2013) propose a fuzzy analytic hierarchy process to evaluate the
effect of critical success factors on the performance of supplier de-
velopment. Focusing on green supplier development, Dou, Zhu, and
Sarkis (2014) introduce a gray analytical network process-based
model to identify supplier development activities that effectively
improve suppliers’ performance. Bai and Sarkis (2014) model co-
operative and non-cooperative supplier development situations as
a game-theoretic analytical evaluation and explore the effect of
returns to scale on investment strategies. Recently, Bai, Dhavale,
and Sarkis (2016) introduce a novel integration of rough set theory
and fuzzy clustering means to provide a methodology for decision
modeling in the context of green supplier development. 
Both empirical evidence and analytical investigations agree that
manufacturer’s direct involvement is critical to the supplier’s par-
ticipation in supplier development. However, development of a
theoretical understanding of the effect of bilateral relationship-
speciﬁc investments on the performance of supplier development
and the application of formal decision-making models proposed for
assisting supply chain partners in balancing such investments in an
appropriate manner have received limited attention in the supplier
development literature. 
In this paper, we consider a manufacturer’s problem of incen-
tivizing suppliers to participate in supplier development programs.
We speciﬁcally focus on direct supplier development, i.e., bilat-
eral relationship-speciﬁc investments, as incentive instrument to
achieve supply chain coordination. Thus, our research also con-
tributes to the stream of literature in operations research that ex-
amines the coordination of suppliers’ cost-reduction effort s in de-
centralized supply chains. 
Several aspects of cost reduction have been studied in the con-
text of decentralized decision structures ( Li & Wang, 2007 ). Kim
(20 0 0) considers a supply chain in which the manufacturer subsi-
dizes supplier’s innovation that can eventually lead to supply cost
reduction and thereby increasing channel proﬁt in a continuous
time setting. Gilbert and Cvsa (2003) study the effect of price com-
mitment to encourage downstream investments in cost-reduction
initiatives under the assumption of demand uncertainty. Consid-
ering an assembly system with a single manufacturer and multi-
ple suppliers, Bernstein and Kök (2009) examine the dynamics of
suppliers’ investments in cost reduction through process improve-
ment effort s over the life cycle of a product. Kogan and Tapiero
(2009) present an inter-temporal model of co-investment in the
supply chain infrastructure and show that supply chain perfor-
mance deteriorates if the ﬁrms do not cooperate. Lee, Palekar, and
Qualls (2011) study coordination problems and corresponding in-
centive mechanisms between a retailer and a manufacturer for
jointly investing in information technologies that have the poten-
tial to improve supply chain eﬃciency. Iida (2012) investigates two
different types of agreements, namely effort sharing agreements
and effort compensation agreements, to achieve supply chain co-
ordination and advance cooperative cost-reduction activities. Using
single-period oligopoly and Cournot duopoly models, Li, Wang, Yin,ull, and Choi (2012) examine the impact of joint cost-reduction
ffort s on the equilibrium outcome. Kim and Netessine (2013) in-
estigate how incentives to collaborate are impacted by informa-
ion asymmetry and contracting strategies, considering a setting
here both the supplier and the manufacturer exert collaborative
ffort s to reduce the unit cost of a critical component during prod-
ct development. Recently, Bernstein, Kök, and Meca (2015) in-
estigate the beneﬁts and challenges of knowledge sharing activi-
ies in a decentralized assembly network in which suppliers invest
n process improvement initiatives to reduce the ﬁxed production
osts. 
In this context, our paper complements research that consid-
rs incentive instruments to induce desirable supplier behavior,
.g., pricing mechanism, contract design, and subsidies for cost-
eduction initiatives. However, unique features of our study, e.g.,
he speciﬁc supplier development context and the introduction of
 negotiation-based coordination algorithm that assists the manu-
acturing ﬁrm in gradually increasing the share of investment costs
o ensure an eﬃcient level of subsidy, differentiate this paper from
he existing literature. 
. Theoretical background 
Sources of economic rents and competitive advantage have
eceived considerable attention in the strategic management lit-
rature. Whereas the industry structure view (e.g., Porter, 1980 )
uggests that economic rents are primarily a function of the struc-
ural characteristics of an industry, the resource-based view of a
rm (e.g., Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984 ) argues that economic
ents are fundamentally due to ﬁrm heterogeneity rather than
ndustry structure. However, because critical resources may extend
eyond ﬁrm boundaries, researchers have also adopted a relational
pproach to explain how business relationships can be a source
f competitive advantage. According to the relational view as
roposed by Dyer and Singh (1998) , ﬁrms who combine, share
nd invest in relationship-speciﬁc assets, substantial knowledge,
omplementary resources, and effective governance may realize
elational rents that cannot be generated by either ﬁrm in iso-
ation. This suggests that activities of supplier development, in
hich ﬁrms convert general-purpose assets such as money, people
kills or managerial knowledge into relationship-speciﬁc assets,
bviously represent a rent-generating process in accordance with
he relational view ( Krause et al., 2007; Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2009 ). 
However, in spite or even because of their relevance for compa-
ies, relationship-speciﬁc assets entail considerable risk and thus
re two-sided. As proposed by transaction cost economics (e.g.,
illiamson, 1979 ), investments in specialization are diﬃcult to re-
eploy outside the focal relationship because specializing a re-
ource lowers its value for alternative uses ( Crosno & Dahlstrom,
008; Wang et al., 2013 ). As such, relationship-speciﬁc investments
ock in the investor and enable the receiver to opportunistically ex-
loit or expropriate the investments’ value by using ex post bar-
aining or threats of termination ( Lui, Wong, & Liu, 2009; Rokkan,
eide, & Wathne, 2003 ). Therefore, the investing ﬁrm sees high
evels of unilateral relationship-speciﬁc investments as vulnerable
o opportunistic expropriation, particular in a dynamic and uncer-
ain business environment ( Hawkins, Wittmann, & Beyerlein, 2008;
ambasivan, Siew-Phaik, Mohamed, & Leong, 2013 ). 
Thus, in the case of unilateral relationship-speciﬁc investments,
.g., indirect supplier development, suppliers tend to assign con-
iderable resources to eradicate or at least minimize the hazards
f opportunistic behavior by the manufacturer. This in turn inﬂu-
nces the supplier’s transaction costs, e.g., ex ante costs of draft-
ng, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement and ex post costs
f adjusting contracts to respond to unexpected contingencies, re-
ulting in decreased eﬃciency of supplier development activities
M. Proch et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 256 (2017) 412–429 415 
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dditionally, concerns about partner opportunism might also tem-
er a supplier’s incentive to contribute resources to manufacturer-
nitiated supplier development activities in the ﬁrst place, a de-
ision that might lead to underinvestment and thus potentially
ndermine the manufacturer’s effort to improve supplier perfor-
ance ( Artz, 1999; Rokkan et al., 2003 ). 
According to the relational view, the employment of effective
overnance may inﬂuence transaction costs and the willingness of
rms to engage in supplier development initiatives, a condition
hat could be an important source of competitive advantage ( Dyer
 Singh, 1998; Li, Humphreys, Yeung, & Cheng, 2007 ). In the ﬁrst
ase, ﬁrms achieve an advantage by incurring lower transaction
osts to realize a given level of supplier development speciﬁcity.
n the second case, appropriate safeguard mechanisms encourage
ompanies to make higher investments in relationship-speciﬁc as-
ets ( Dyer, 1996b; Vázquez et al., 2007 ). Following this line of rea-
oning, ﬁrms’ ability to align a considerable level of relationship-
peciﬁc investments with an appropriate safeguard mechanism
ould enhance eﬃciency and effectiveness of supplier development
ctivities and thereby should be critical to the success of supplier
evelopment. 
Although ﬁrms can select a variety of safeguard mechanisms,
egal contracts are typically considered the primary formal means
or safeguarding transactions. Contracts are formalized, legally
inding agreements that explicitly specify the obligations of each
rm ( Artz, 1999 ). If one ﬁrm violates the terms of the contract, the
ther has the right to go to a third party to impose corrective ac-
ion. Thus, contracts can prevent opportunistic behavior through
egal force ( Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009 ). The drawback to contractual
echanisms is that as the transaction becomes more complex, so
oo must the contract protecting the exchange – and the costs
f writing, monitoring and enforcing the contract increase ( Dyer,
997 ). 
Another approach to managing opportunistic behavior in
anufacturer-supplier relationships is to design incentive struc-
ures that deter opportunistic behavior. In Telser ’s (1980) termi-
ology, a strong disincentive for partner opportunism can be cre-
ted by designing self-enforcing agreements that make long-term
ains from the ongoing relationship exceed potential short-term
ayoffs from acting opportunistically, making the use of legal con-
racts redundant. Scholars usually argue that self-enforcing agree-
ents are a less costly and more effective means of safeguarding
elationship-speciﬁc investments ( Artz, 1999; Dyer, 1996a ). Within
elf-enforcing agreements, contracting costs are avoided because
rms behave in a more trustworthy fashion. Therefore, specifying
very detail of the agreement in a contract is not necessary. In ad-
ition, monitoring costs are lower because self-enforcement relies
n self-monitoring rather than external or third party monitoring.
inally, self-enforcing agreements lower the costs associated with
omplex adaptation because ﬁrms are able to adjust the agree-
ent in a straightforward manner to respond to unforeseen market
hanges ( Dyer & Singh, 1998 ). 
Several researchers suggest that ﬁrms can accomplish self-
nforcing agreements by making bilateral relationship-speciﬁc in-
estments (e.g., Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Gundlach, Achrol, &
entzer, 1995; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Palmatier, Dant, & Grewal,
007 ). It is argued that investments made by both sides of an ex-
hange serve as mutual hostages or as credible commitments that
otivate ﬁrms to make the relationship work. On the one hand, bi-
ateral relationship-speciﬁc investments strengthen the bonds be-
ween companies and contribute to a stable relationship because
eciprocal actions are considered indications of each ﬁrm’s com-
itment to the relationship. On the other hand, bilateral credible
ommitments tend to diminish the potential threat of partner op-
ortunism because opportunistic behavior by one party can be mety retaliation from the other, a situation that could lead to the for-
eiture of both the buyer’s and the supplier’s investments’ actual
alue ( Xie et al., 2010 ). 
Therefore, if both manufacturer and supplier invest in supplier
evelopment, a self-enforcing agreement will exist that should
ake the installation of an additional governance mechanism re-
undant. With fewer opportunism concerns and lower safeguard-
ng costs, supplier development becomes more eﬃcient, more
rone to joint action and includes greater expectations of conti-
uity, all of which contribute to enhanced performance. In other
ords, direct supplier development provides an incentive to the
upplier to behave in a more trustworthy fashion to maintain
nd continue the relationship until the value of its investments is
ecouped. 
. Basic model 
We consider a particular two-stage supply chain situation with
 supplier S and a manufacturer M , in which M assembles compo-
ents from S and sells the ﬁnal product to the market. Let the price
istribution function p : R → R , which establishes a connection
etween the production quantity d and its sale price p , be given
y p(d) = a − bd where coeﬃcients a > 0 and b > 0 denote the
rohibitive price, e.g., the maximum willingness to pay, and the
rice elasticity of the commodity, respectively. This situation might
e comparable with an oligopolistic or monopolistic market condi-
ion, in which a ﬁrm can increase market demand by lowering the
ale price. Note that we do not distinguish market demand from
he production quantity of the manufacturer because the market
rice is endogenous to the quantity sold. Ignoring ﬁxed costs, the
anufacturer’s proﬁt is 
 · (p(d) − c M − c SC ) . (1) 
Here, c M denotes the manufacturer’s unit production costs,
hereas c SC represents the supply costs per unit charged by S .
ecause the manufacturer’s goal is proﬁt maximization, the pro-
uction quantity d chosen by M is determined by differentiating
1) w.r.t. d and setting the resulting expression equal to zero, i.e.,
p(d) − c M − c SC − bd ! = 0 , (2)
hich yields the optimum production quantity d  = a −c M −c SC 
2 b 
and
he optimal sale price p(d  ) = a + c M + c SC 2 . Since (1) is a quadratic
nd concave function, (2) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
or proﬁt maximization. 
Typically, M is contractually obliged to S for a certain period, or
 time units. Assuming that supply costs c SC are constant over the
ontract period [0, T ], the manufacturer’s overall proﬁt is 
 
M 
0 := T · ( d  · (p(d  ) − c M − c SC ) ) = 
(a − c M − c SC ) 2 
4 b 
· T . 
Furthermore, let us suppose that the supply costs consist of the
upplier’s ﬁxed proﬁt margin r and the supplier’s unit production
osts c S , i.e., c SC = r + c S . Thus, M commits to pay a constant mar-
in above the expected unit production costs of S , no matter what
evel of d is realized. Similar approaches to specify the supply costs
ave been proposed by Bernstein and Kök (2009) , Li et al. (2012) ,
nd Kim and Netessine (2013) . We do not consider the detailed ne-
otiations of a particular proﬁt margin and simply consider r as ex-
genously given. Moreover, the supplier produces the components
o satisfy d ; thus, S does not make a production quantity decision.
ence, the supplier’s proﬁt is 
 
S 
0 := d  · r · T = 
a − c M − (r + c S ) 
2 b 
· r · T , 
nd the overall proﬁt of the supply chain is 
 
SC 
0 := J M 0 + J S 0 = 
(a − c M − c S ) 2 − r 2 
4 b 
· T . 
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2 b We further assume that M wants to decrease c S by establishing
supplier development projects on the supplier’s side to increase
the market share, which might lead to an increased overall proﬁt
of the supply chain. To this end, the sustainable effect of supplier
development on the supplier’s unit production costs c S is modeled
by c S (x ) = c 0 x m , where c 0 > 0 denotes the supplier’s unit produc-
tion cost at the beginning of the contract period, m the supplier’s
learning rate, and x measures the undertaken effort, e.g., the cumu-
lative number of realized supplier development projects. The effort
is modeled as a time-dependent function x : [0 , T ] → R ≥0 governed
by dynamics 
˙ x(t) := d 
dt 
x (t) = u (t) , x (0) = x 0 = 1 , (3)
with u : [0, T ) → [0, ω] to reﬂect that x increases during the con-
tract period. Indeed, the ordinary differential Eq. (3) is easy to
solve, i.e., x (t) = x 0 + 
∫ t 
0 u (s ) d s assuming u to be suﬃciently reg-
ular such that the solution of the differential equation uniquely
exists and is (at least) absolutely continuous. Here, u ( t ) represents
the effort at time t , with a capacity limit of ω > 0, e.g., the re-
source availability in terms of time, manpower or budget. Because
an accurate determination of ω is not critical to our discussion, a
presumption is made that ω is exogenously assessed to be feasible
to the problem. The learning rate m = ln (1 −θ ) 
ln χ
, θ ∈ [0, 1) and χ >
1, can be interpreted as follows. If, e.g., parameters θ = 0 . 05 and
χ = 2 are used, the effort x must be doubled to reduce the sup-
plier’s production costs c S (x ) = c 0 x m per unit by 5 percent . Similar
models of cost reduction through learning have been proposed by
Yelle (1979) , Fine and Porteus (1989) , Kim (20 0 0) , Bernstein and
Kök (2009) , and Li et al. (2012) . 
In summary, c S (x (t)) = c 0 x (t) m is time varying, continuously
decreasing, strictly positive, and convex. It is important to realize
that, consequently, not only the optimal quantity offered d  ( c SC )
but also the respective optimal sale price and the proﬁt become
time dependent. Moreover, adding c SD u ( t ), c SD ≥ 0, to the overall
proﬁt of the supply chain allows for integrating the costs of sup-
plier development into the proposed model. Hence, a central task
is to understand how supplier development contributes to the total
proﬁt, i.e., whether improving the cost structure c S to generate fur-
ther revenues outweighs the additional costs of supplier develop-
ment. Answering this question naturally leads to seeking the best
solution under the guiding principle of proﬁt maximization. In the
subsequent section, an optimal control problem is formulated to
rigorously deduce the solution. 
5. Supplier development in a centralized supply chain 
In this section, we assume the existence of a central entity
managing the supply chain as an integrated system in which all
parameters, e.g., the optimal amount of effort invested in supplier
development, are simultaneously chosen. We call the resulting so-
lution of the problem the centralized solution because it is based on
a centralized decision-making process. 
Employing the variables and parameters of the preceding sec-
tion, the proﬁt function J SC : L 1 ([0 , T ) , R ) → R deﬁned as 
J SC (u ) := 
∫ T 
0 
(a − c M − c 0 x (t) m ) 2 − r 2 
4 b 
− c SD u (t) d t (4)
must be maximized subject to the control constraints 0 ≤ u ( t ) ≤
ω, t ∈ [0, T ), and the system dynamics (3) . L 1 ([0 , T ) , R ) is the set
of measurable functions for which the condition 
∫ T 
0 | u (t) | d t < ∞
holds. Mathematically speaking, the central entity must solve an
optimal control problem to determine the optimal control func-
tion u  , i.e., the centralized optimal collaboration strategy, such
that the accumulated proﬁt J SC ( ·) is maximized. Because investments c SD u ( t ) pay off over time due to an im-
roved cost structure, the optimal control function u  is struc-
urally of the shape 
 
 (t) := 
{
ω if t < t  
0 if t ≥ t  , (5)
ith t  ∈ [0, T ] not yet determined. Here, t  = 0 corresponds to
he case in which supplier development does not increase the ac-
umulated proﬁt, i.e., the considered time horizon T (contract pe-
iod) is too short such that the achievable cost reduction does not
utweigh the required capital effort 
∫ T 
0 c SC u (t ) d t . Hence, the op-
imal control problem to be solved corresponds to ﬁnding t  such
hat the system-wide optimum is attained. The claims based on
euristic arguments can be deduced in a rigorous manner by us-
ng Pontryagin’s maximum principle (see, e.g., Kim, 20 0 0 ) and not-
ng that J SC ( ·) is continuous whereas parameter t  is limited to a
ompact (closed and bounded) interval. 
Note that the production quantity d ( t ) at time t is solely cho-
en by M without considering any collaboration effects. This as-
umption on the decision-making process justiﬁes the optimal sale
rice used in the above calculations. Albeit the phenomenon of a
o-called double marginalization may lead to a suboptimal solu-
ion ( Li, Li, & Cai, 2013 ), this assumption is made to assess the ef-
ciency of the proposed coordination mechanism separately. 
emark 5.1. Although J SC ( ·) is optimized w.r.t. u ∈ L 1 ([0 , T ) ,
0 , ω]) , i.e., it is a set of measurable and bounded functions, the
ptimal control function u  ( ·) is piecewise constant and bang-bang
ith one jump at t  . Hence, the resulting solution is easily imple-
entable and corresponds to (full) cooperation in terms of sup-
lier development until time t  . Then, the improved cost structure
s exploited without making further investments. 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle is used to solve the optimal
ontrol problem (4) . To this end, the so-called Hamiltonian H(·) ,
hich is deﬁned as 
(x, u, λ) := (a − c M − c 0 x 
m ) 2 − r 2 
4 b 
− c SD u + λu, 
s needed to formulate the necessary optimality conditions. This
ields the system dynamics 
˙  (t) = H λ(x  (t) , u  (t) , λ(t)) = u  (t) , 
he so-called adjoint λ : [0 , T ] → R , which is characterized by 
˙ (t) = −H x (x  (t) , u  (t) , λ(t)) = mc 0 x 
 (t) m −1 (a − c M − c 0 x  (t) m ) 
2 b 
(6)
nd the transversality condition 
(T ) = 0 . (7)
Solving the optimal control problem yields the structural prop-
rty (5) of the optimal control function u  . Then, the (absolutely
ontinuous) state trajectory 
 
 (t) = 
{
1 + ωt t ∈ [0 , t  ) 
1 + ωt  t ∈ [ t  , T ] (8)
an be computed using the system dynamics (3) and the initial
ondition x (0) = x 0 = 1 . In particular, x  ( t ) ≥ 1 holds for all t ∈ [0,
 ]. Hence, Eq. (6) implies that the adjoint λ ( ·) exhibits a strictly
egative derivative, i.e., ˙ λ(t) < 0 since the inequalities m < 0 and
 > c M + c 0 imply a > c M + c 0 x  (t) m for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, us-
ng (8) , the system dynamics of the adjoint (6) , and the transver-
ality condition (7) allow us to calculate the adjoint 
(t) = mc 0 (1 + ωt 
 ) m −1 (a − c M − c 0 (1 + ωt  ) m ) · ( t − T ) 
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the switching condition (9) . 
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por all t ∈ [ t  , T ]. Then, based on the fact that m < 0 holds, the
djoint Eq. (6) implies λ( t ), t ∈ [0, t  ], 
(t) = λ(t  ) −
∫ t  
t 
˙ λ(s ) d s 
= λ(t  ) − mc 0 (a − c M ) 
2 b 
∫ t  
t 
x (s ) m −1 d s + mc 
2 
0 
2 b 
∫ t  
t 
x (s ) 2 m −1 d s 
= λ(t  ) − c 0 (a − c M )((1 + ωt 
 ) m − (1 + ωt) m ) 
2 ωb 
+ c 
2 
0 ((1 + ωt  ) 2 m − (1 + ωt) 2 m ) 
4 ωb 
. 
ence, the switching time t  can be computed by solving the
quation 
 u (x 
 (t) , u  (t) , λ(t)) = −c SD + λ(t) = 0 
nd is thus given by the solution of the equation 
mc 0 (1 + ωt  ) m −1 (a − c M − c 0 (1 + ωt  ) m ) 
2 b 
· (t  − T ) = c SD (9) 
ith respect to t  . Consequently, the optimal control function u  
nd the resulting proﬁt J SC ( u  ) are determined. 
Economically, the adjoint variable λ can be interpreted as a
hadow price that represents the rate of inﬁnitesimal change of the
erformance measure, i.e., the marginal revenue, with respect to
n inﬁnitesimal change of the state variable x ( ·). Hence, by means
f the adjoint variable λ and the supplier development costs c SD ,
he economic eﬃciency (proﬁtability) of further investments in
upplier development can be assessed. As expressed by the switch-
ng condition (9) , at time t  the adjoint variable λ( t  ) equals the
upplier development costs c SD . Hence, cost-reduction effort s af-
er time t  are not economically reasonable, see Fig. 1 for an
llustration. 
ssumption 5.1. Throughout this paper it is tacitly assumed that
upplier development can increase the supply chain proﬁt. Fur-
hermore, it is supposed that full cooperation, i.e., u¯ (t) = ω for
ll t ∈ [0, T ), is not the optimal solution. Mathematically speak-
ng, this implies the existence of a collaboration strategy u ∈
 
1 ([0 , T ) , R ) satisfying 0 ≤ u ( t ) ≤ ω, t ∈ [0, T ), such that the
nequality 
 
SC (u ) > max { J SC 0 , J SC ( ¯u ) } 
olds and thus ensures that the (global) maximum is attained for
 switching time t  located in the open interval (0, T ). Here, J SC 
0 
and
 
SC ( ¯u ) represent t  = 0 (no collaboration) and t  = T (full collabo-
ation), respectively. 
Because an optimal solution exists and Assumption 5.1 holds,
very optimal solution must satisfy the necessary optimality condi-ions resulting from Pontryagin’s maximum principle. Furthermore,
ote that the solution of (9) is unique, because the adjoint and
hus the left hand side of this equation are strictly monotonically
ecreasing. Hence, taking the structural property (5) into account,
he switching time t  ∈ (0, T ) and the corresponding optimal
ontrol function u  ( ·) are uniquely determined. 
In conclusion, considering the proﬁt in dependence of the
witching time t , the deduced qualitative behavior directly implies
hat the supply chain proﬁt strictly increases for switching times t
 [0, t  ), which are smaller than the optimal switching time t  , and
hen strictly decreases for switching times t ∈ ( t  , T ], see Fig. 2 for
n illustration. 
In short, an elementary proof showing that the necessary con-
ition resulting from Pontryagin’s maximum principle is also suf-
cient in the considered setting was presented. An alternative line
f argumentation analogous to Chiang (1992) , which structurally
ts the optimal control problem to be solved and thus could be
pplied, would lead to the same conclusion. 
The decision-making process in a centralized supply chain en-
ures system eﬃciency and opts for the optimum level of supplier
evelopment, i.e., maximizes the total (expected) proﬁt of the sup-
ly chain. Thus, the centralized solution serves as a benchmark for
he following analysis. 
. Indirect supplier development in a decentralized supply 
hain 
Next, we consider the decision-making process in a decentral-
zed supply chain, which differs from the centrally planned one in
wo fundamental aspects. First, there is no information exchange
uring the planning phase, resulting in asymmetrical distribution
f information, e.g., information about the supplier’s cost struc-
ure may be unknown to the manufacturer. Second, every decision
aker in a supply chain typically has different objectives, which
ay lead to conﬂicting strategic orientations. The presence of both
ssues could cause ineﬃciency in the supply chain ( Corbett, 2001;
ida, 2012 ). Consequently, the solution of the decision-making pro-
ess in a decentralized supply chain could deviate from the cen-
ralized solution . 
We ﬁrst analyze the supplier’s optimal decision-making process
nder the assumption of indirect supplier development, in which
he supplier must bear the invested effort alone. Intuitively, S will
etermine the optimal supplier development level to reduce the
nit production costs of the components, considering the manu-
acturer’s optimal reaction in terms of procurement quantity. Then,
he supplier’s cost-reduction effort s are realized. Next, M chooses
he optimal production quantity based on the resulting supply
rice. Our solution approach formalizes the above reasoning. 
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Fig. 2. The supply chain proﬁt J SC is depicted in dependence of the switching time t . 
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a6.1. Indirect supplier development 
In the case of indirect supplier development the supplier’s
proﬁt J S : L 1 ([0 , T ) , R ) → R , which is deﬁned as 
J S (u S ) := 
∫ T 
0 
a − c M − (r + c 0 x (t) m ) 
2 b 
· r − c SD u S (t ) d t , (10)
is maximized subject to the system dynamics (3) and the control
constraints 0 ≤ u S ( t ) ≤ ω, t ∈ [0, T ), where the index S indicates
that u S represents the collaboration strategy from the supplier’s
point of view. Note that also the cumulative number of realized
supplier development projects x ( ·) at time t depends of the cho-
sen control function u S in view of the differential equation (3) .
However, we dropped the index S in order to streamline the pre-
sentation. In summary, S solves an optimal control problem to de-
termine the supplier’s optimal control function u  S such that the
supplier’s proﬁt J S (u  
S 
) is maximized. 
Proceeding analogously to the centralized approach, the sup-
plier’s adjoint equation is characterized by 
˙ λS (t) = rmc 0 x (t) 
m −1 
2 b 
and the corresponding adjoint is given by 
λS (t) = 
{ 
rmc 0 (1+ ωt  S ) m −1 
2 b 
· (t − T ) t ∈ [ t  S , T ] 
λS (t 
 
S ) − rc 0 2 ωb ((1 + ωt  S ) m − (1 + ωt) m ) t ∈ [0 , t  S ) 
. 
Here, t  S must satisfy λS (t 
 
S ) = c SD , i.e., 
rmc 0 (1 + ωt  S ) m −1 
2 b 
· (t  S − T ) = c SD . (11)
Hence, the supplier’s optimal control function u  
S 
and the supplier’s
proﬁt J S (u  
S 
) are determined. 
In the indirect supplier development case, it is implicitly as-
sumed that the investment decision is solely up to the supplier.
This assumption is justiﬁed, because S covers all supplier develop-
ment costs 
∫ T 
0 c SD u S (t ) d t , whereas M beneﬁts from the supplier’s
cost-reduction efforts by reduced supply costs without committing
any resources to supplier development. Indeed, M would opt for
full cooperation, i.e., u¯ (t) = ω for all t ∈ [0, T ). From the supplier’s
point of view, however, cost-reduction efforts after time t  S do not
amortize during the contract period and thus are not economically
reasonable, see Fig. 3 . Hence, the collaboration stops after t  
S 
time
units. 
Consequently, the corresponding manufacturer’s proﬁt is given
by 
J M (u  S ) := 
∫ T 
0 
(a − c M − r − c 0 x (t) m ) 2 
4 b 
d t. 
Summing up J S (u  ) + J M (u  ) yields J SC (u  ) . 
S S S .2. Comparison with the centralized solution 
We next compare the centralized solution , cf. Section 5 , with the
utcome of the decentralized decision-making process in the case
f indirect supplier development. Here, it can be observed that
he structural property (5) is maintained. However, the switching
ime t  
S 
may change. 
roposition 6.1. Let Assumption 5.1 hold. Then, the supply chain
roﬁt obtained in the centralized decision-making process character-
zed by t  is superior in comparison to its counterpart obtained in the
ecentralized setting characterized by t  
S 
. 
roof. Since it has been shown in Section 5 that the optimal solu-
ion is unique, showing that t   = t  
S 
holds is suﬃcient to prove the
ssertion. Using Eqs. (9) and (11) leads to 
 · f (t  S ) = (a − c M − c 0 (1 + ωt  ) m ) · f (t  ) 
ith strictly decreasing function f : [0 , T ] → R ≥0 deﬁned as f :=
 	→ mc 0 (1+ ωt) m −1 ·(t−T ) 
2 b 
. Hence, if r < (a − c M − c 0 (1 + ωt  ) m ) holds,
he switching time for the centralized solution t  will be strictly
arger than its counterpart t  
S 
for the decentralized one. 
Because the prohibitive price a is strictly larger than the costs
er unit c M + c SC = c M + r + c 0 without any supplier development
a necessary condition for the manufacturer – the inequality a >
 M + c SC (t) = c M + r + c 0 (1 + ωt) m holds for all t ∈ [0, T ] and thus
n particular for t  ∈ (0, T ], i.e., in the case that supplier develop-
ent can contribute to the supply chain proﬁt. Hence, the asser-
ion follows. 
In other words, if the supplier defrays all supplier development
osts, i.e., indirect supplier development, S will choose a smaller
witching time t  
S 
, t  
S 
< t  , and thus will stop the collaboration “too
arly”. 
. Direct supplier development in a decentralized supply chain 
Next, we investigate the decentralized decision-making process
nder the assumption of direct supplier development. Hereto, we
uppose that the manufacturer covers a certain share αc SD , α ∈
0, 1], of the supplier development costs c SD to align potentially
ontradictory objectives and thus alleviate the ineﬃciencies occur-
ing in the indirect supplier development case. This assumption is
ot completely new: within the automobile industry, for instance,
anufacturers offer assistance by providing training, equipment
nd tools to their suppliers, or sharing the monetary costs of in-
estments ( Bernstein et al., 2015; Sako, 2004 ). Moreover, similar
pproaches to specify a subsidy for cost-reduction initiatives have
lso been proposed by Iida (2012) , Li et al. (2012) , and Bernstein
nd Kök (2009) . 
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Fig. 3. The supply chain proﬁt J SC (solid line), the supplier’s proﬁt J S (dotted line), and the manufacturer’s proﬁt J M (dashed line) are depicted in dependence of the switching 
time t . 
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t.1. Direct supplier development 
Incorporating the cost allocation factor α, the supplier’s proﬁt
unction (10) is changed to 
 
S (u S ) := 
∫ T 
0 
a − c M − (r + c 0 x (t) m ) 
2 b 
· r − (1 − α) c SD u S (t ) d t , 
hile the manufacturer’s proﬁt function is given by 
 
M (u M ) := 
∫ T 
0 
(a − c M − r − c 0 x (t) m ) 2 
4 b 
− αc SD u M (t) d t, 
here the index M indicates that u M ( ·) represents the collabora-
ion strategy from the manufacturer’s point of view. 
In the case of direct supplier development the manufacturer
upports the supplier’s cost-reduction efforts with, e.g., matched
esources, and thus actively participates in the decentralized
ecision-making process. Hence, both the supplier and the manu-
acturer solve an optimal control problem to determine their op-
imal control functions u  
S 
and u  
M 
maximizing their individual
roﬁts J S (u  S ) and J 
M (u  M ) , respectively. 
Due to the adaptation of the cost functional J S , the right hand
ide of the supplier’s switching condition (11) is multiplied with
he factor (1 − α) , i.e., 
rmc 0 (1 + ωt  S ) m −1 
2 b 
· (t  S − T ) = (1 − α) c SD , (12) 
hich yields t  S and, consequently, the supplier’s optimal control
unction u  
S 
. 
Applying the same reasoning as in the centralized approach, it
an be observed that the structural property (5) also holds for M .
hus, the manufacturer’s adjoint equation is characterized by 
˙ 
M (t) = mc 0 x (t) m −1 · (a − c M − r − c 0 x (t) m ) / (2 b) (13) 
nd the manufacturer’s adjoint is given by 
M (t) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎩ 
mc 0 (1+ ωt  M ) m −1 ·(a −c M −r−c 0 (1+ ωt  M ) m ) 
2 b 
· (t − T ) for t ∈ [ t  M , T ] 
λM (t 
 
M ) −
c 0 (a −c M −r)[(1+ ωt  M ) m −(1+ ωt) m ] 
2 ωb 
+ c 2 0 [(1+ ωt  M ) 2 m −(1+ ωt) 2 m ] 
4 ωb 
for t ∈ [0 , t  M ) 
. 
(14) 
The manufacturer’s optimal switching time t  M is determined by
he switching condition λM (t 
 
M 
) = αc SD , i.e., 
mc 0 (1 + ωt  M ) m −1 · (a − c M − r − c 0 (1 + ωt  M ) m ) 
2 b 
· (t  M −T ) = αc SD ,
(15) hich characterizes the manufacturer’s optimal control function
 
 
M . 
In general, t  
M 
and u  
M 
do not coincide with t  
S 
and u  
S 
, respec-
ively. However, direct supplier development is a reciprocal ap-
roach that requires a mutually agreed collaboration strategy be-
ween the participating ﬁrms. Consequently, M cannot pursue the
anufacturer’s optimal collaboration strategy without considering
he supplier’s optimal collaboration strategy, and vice versa. Here,
e heavily exploit the structural property (5) : both S and M mono-
onically increase their respective proﬁt until t = min { t  
S 
, t  
M 
} , be-
ause their respective investments in supplier development pay
ff during the considered time interval [0, T ] due to an improved
ost structure. Hence, both ﬁrms willingly collaborate until that
ime. However, for t > min { t  
S 
, t  
M 
} further cost-reduction effort s
o not amortize during the contract period from the perspec-
ive of at least one ﬁrm, cf. the switching conditions (12) and
15) . Because prolonging supplier development is not economi-
ally reasonable for at least one ﬁrm, the collaboration stops at
 = min { t  
S 
, t  
M 
} . Mathematically speaking, the (mutually agreed)
ollaboration strategy on supply chain level is limited by
in { t  S , t  M } . In conclusion, the (mutually agreed) optimal control
unction u  SC is structurally of shape 
 
 
SC (t) := 
{
ω if t < min { t  S , t  M } 
0 if t ≥ min { t  S , t  M } 
, 
s illustrated in Fig. 4 . 
Accordingly, the individual ﬁrms’ proﬁts are now determined by
 
 
SC . Summing up J 
S (u  SC ) + J M (u  SC ) yields the overall supply chain
roﬁt J SC (u  
SC 
) . 
roposition 7.1. Let Assumption 5.1 hold and let α ∈ [0, 1] be given.
hen, if the individual ﬁrms’ switching times t  S ∈ [0 , T ] and t  M ∈
0 , T ] do not coincide, the centralized decision-making process char-
cterized by t  leads to a (strictly) higher supply chain proﬁt J SC ( u  )
han its counterpart J SC (u  SC ) with switching time t 
 
SC := min { t  S , t  M }
btained in the case of (in)direct supplier development. 
roof. For α = 0 , i.e., indirect supplier development, the assertion
ollows directly from Proposition 6.1 . Hence, let α be contained in
he interval (0, 1]. Since it has been shown in Section 5 that the
ptimal solution is unique, the equality t  = min { t  
S 
, t  
M 
} must hold.
ithout loss of generality, let us assume that t  = t  
S 
holds; a sim-
lar argumentation proves the claim in case of t  = t  M . Then, using
he switching conditions (9) and (12) yields 
420 M. Proch et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 256 (2017) 412–429 
Fig. 4. The supplier’s proﬁt J S (dotted line), the manufacturer’s proﬁt J M (dashed line), and the (mutually agreed) collaboration strategy (solid line) – represented by the 
optimal control function u  SC – for α = 0 . 5 using the parameter set introduced in Table 1 . 
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c2 b · αc SD = mc 0 (1 + ωt  ) m −1 (t  −T ) · (a − c M − r − c 0 (1 + ωt  ) m ) .
(16)
Because t  
S 
 = t  
M 
and t  = min { t  
S 
, t  
M 
} hold, the manufacturer’s op-
timal switching time will be strictly larger than its counterpart
for the centralized solution , i.e., t  M > t 
 . Thus, the manufacturer’s
switching condition (15) implies 
2 b · αc SD < mc 0 (1 + ωt  ) m −1 (t  −T ) · (a − c M − r − c 0 (1 + ωt  ) m ) ,
a contradiction to (16) . Hence, t   = min { t  S , t  M } follows, which com-
pletes the proof. 
By means of the ﬁrms’ switching conditions (12) and (15) , both
the supplier and the manufacturer can assess the economic eﬃ-
ciency of further investments in supplier development. Based on
these information and the mutually agreed switching time t  
SC 
:=
min { t  
S 
, t  
M 
} , three cases can be distinguished: 
(1) t  
S 
< t  
M 
, i.e., λS (t 
 
SC 
) = (1 − α) c SD and λM (t  SC ) > αc SD , 
(2) t  
S 
> t  
M 
, i.e., λS (t 
 
SC 
) > (1 − α) c SD and λM (t  SC ) = αc SD , and 
(3) t  S = t  M , i.e., λS (t  SC ) = (1 − α) c SD and λM (t  SC ) = αc SD . 
Since λM (t 
 
SC ) + λS (t  SC ) > c SD holds in the ﬁrst two cases, fur-
ther cost reduction effort s pay off during the contract period from
the supply chain perspective, i.e., either the manufacturer M (Case
1) or the supplier (Case 2) is interested in extending the collabo-
ration by adapting the α-value. In Case 3 neither ﬁrm has a prof-
itable unilateral deviation from the (mutually agreed) collaboration
strategy. Following this line of reasoning, we can even prove that
the supply chain proﬁt obtained in the centralized decision-making
process characterized by t  , i.e., the centralized solution , coincides
with its counterpart obtained in the decentralized setting charac-
terized by t  SC for an appropriately chosen cost allocation factor. 
Theorem 7.1. Let Assumption 5.1 hold. Then, there uniquely exists a
cost allocation factor α ∈ (0, 1) such that t  
S 
and t  
M 
, determined ac-
cordingly to the switching conditions (12) and (15) , respectively, coin-
cide, i.e., t  = t  . Moreover, the resulting (mutually agreed) switching
S M ime t  SC := min { t  S , t  M } coincides with the optimal switching time t  
f the centralized solution . 
roof. For α = 0 , the manufacturer’s optimal switching time t  
M 
quals the ﬁnal time T of the contractual period and t  S < T holds
n view of Assumption 5.1 . Moreover, t  
M 
< T holds for all α ∈
0, 1] according to the manufacturer’s switching condition (15) .
n addition, because the left hand side of (15) is strictly decreas-
ng with respect to t  
M 
, the manufacturer’s optimal switching time
 
 
M 
= t  
M 
(α) strictly decreases on the interval of admissible cost al-
ocation factors α ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, in view of Assumption 5.1 and
ccording to the supplier’s switching condition (12) , t  S = T holds
f and only if α = 1 . Furthermore, because the left hand side of
12) is strictly decreasing in t  
S 
, the supplier’s optimal switching
ime t  S = t  S (α) increases on the interval of admissible cost alloca-
ion factors α ∈ [0, 1]. 
Let us deﬁne the (allocation) function a S : [0, 1] → [0, T ] by
 S (α) = t  S where t  S satisﬁes the supplier’s switching condition
12) . Analogously, a M : [0, 1] → [0, T ] is deﬁned as a M (α) = t  M with
 
 
M 
chosen in accordance with (15) . The above reasoning shows that
 S (1) = T and a M (0) = T hold and that a S is strictly monotonically
ncreasing on its domain [0, 1] while a M is strictly monotonically
ecreasing on its domain [0, 1]. 
Hence, the continuous function f : [0 , 1] → R , f (α) 	→ a M (α) −
 S (α) , is strictly monotonically decreasing with f (0) > 0 and f (1) <
. Using the mean value theorem shows the existence of α such
hat f (α ) = 0 holds or, equivalently, a M (α ) = a S (α ) , i.e., the in-
ividual ﬁrms’ switching times coincide for the cost allocation fac-
or α . 
Then, using this cost allocation factor and adding the switch-
ng conditions (12) and (15) shows that the resulting switching
ime t  
SC 
= t  
S 
= t  
M 
satisﬁes the switching condition (9) . Because t  
s uniquely determined by (9) , t  
SC 
= t  holds. Hence, the resulting
ontrol functions and the respective supply chain proﬁts also coin-
ide, which shows the assertion. 
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Table 1 
List of parameter values (basic scenario). 
T a b c M c 0 r c SD ω m 
60 200 0.01 70 100 15 10 0,0 0 0 1 −0.1 
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ﬁ  As a conclusion that can be drawn from Proposition 7.1 and
heorem 7.1 , it is desirable that the desired switching times t  
S 
nd t  M coincide in order to achieve the system-wide optimum, i.e.,
 
 
S 
= t  
M 
= t  . To demonstrate the impact of direct supplier develop-
ent on the individual ﬁrms’ switching times, a numerical analysis
s conducted in the subsequent section. 
.2. Numerical analysis and managerial insights part I 
The above reasoning shows that M can prolong the collabora-
ion and thus increase the supply chain proﬁt of the decentralized
upply chain by subsidizing a certain share of the supplier develop-
ent costs. We examine numerical examples using the parameter
alues in Table 1 to obtain more managerial insights. 
Because we are interested in the dependence of the individual
rms’ switching times on the cost allocation factor α, we begin
ur numerical analysis by evaluating the switching conditions
iven by Eqs. (12) and (15) for all admissible α values, i.e., α
 [0, 1]. Fig. 5 shows that both t ∗
S 
and t ∗
M 
change continuously
nd monotonically with respect to α. If α = 0 holds, S covers the
upplier development costs completely. Hence, M can exploit the
chieved cost reductions for free, which implies t  
M 
= T . Conversely,
or α = 1 , S beneﬁts from the increasing quantity supplied at the
arket, whereas M bears all supplier development costs resulting
n t  
S 
= T . We also integrated the supply chain proﬁt J SC (u  
SC 
) . Here,
e observe that the system-wide optimum is attained for t  S = t  M .
iven 0 < t  
S 
< t  
M 
= T for α = 0 , 0 < t  
M 
< t  
S 
= T for α = 1 and the
act that t  
S 
and t  
M 
change continuously and monotonically with
espect to α, the supply chain partners’ objectives can be aligned,
.e., t  S = t  M , as shown in Theorem 7.1 . Thus, the manufacturing
rm can induce the centralized solution by choosing the cost
llocation factor α ∈ (0, 1) appropriately. 
To analyze the effect of direct supplier development on sup-
ly chain performance more deeply, we vary the parameters b ∈
0.0 07, 0.0 08, 0.0 09, 0.01, 0.011, 0.012, 0.013}, r ∈ {12, 13, 14, 15,
6, 17, 18}, c SD ∈ {70 0 0 0, 80 0 0 0, 90 0 0 0, 10 0 0 0 0, 110 0 0 0, 120 0 0 0,
30 0 0 0}, and m ∈ { −0.13, −0.12, −0.11, −0.1, −0.09, −0.08, −0.07},
esulting in a total number of 7 4 = 2401 instances. For each pa-
ameter combination, we compute both the supply chain proﬁt
 
SC (u  
SC 
) resulting from direct supplier development ( α = α ) and
he corresponding proﬁt J SC (u  
S 
) resulting from indirect supplier
evelopment ( α = 0 ), and then compare the respective proﬁts. TheFig. 5. Optimal switching times t  S (dotted line) and t 
 
M (dashed line), and the sepicted histogram in Fig. 6 shows the absolute frequency with
hich a percentage of proﬁt increase is observed within our pa-
ameter set. For all computed instances, the ratios are positive. The
rithmetic mean is 19 . 76 percent, with a standard deviation of 5 . 14
ercent and a median of 19 . 12 percent, which shows that a direct
nvolvement of the manufacturer leads to a signiﬁcant improve-
ent of supply chain performance. 
According to Kim (20 0 0) , a system-wide optimum might not
ecessarily be optimal to each individual ﬁrm in a supply chain.
iven this background, we also compute the individual ﬁrms’ prof-
ts for the considered parameter set and compare the proﬁts re-
ulting from direct supplier development, i.e., J S (u  
SC 
) and J M (u  
SC 
) ,
ith the corresponding proﬁts resulting from indirect supplier
evelopment, i.e., J S (u  S ) and J 
M (u  S ) , respectively. At 6 . 38 per-
ent, with a standard deviation of 8 . 18 percent and a median of
 . 96 percent, the manufacturer’s average-proﬁt increase ratio is
ubstantially lower than the corresponding ratio for the supplier
 34 . 95 percent, with a standard deviation of 5 . 96 percent and a
edian of 34 . 85 percent). Moreover, although the supplier’s ratios
re strictly positive, the manufacturer suffers losses in 595 out of
401 instances, cf. Fig. 7 . 
In conclusion, the results of our numerical analysis are twofold.
n the one hand, supply chain coordination can be achieved by
dopting direct supplier development, resulting in a possibly pro-
onged collaboration phase and the optimal system-wide proﬁt
orresponding to our benchmark – the centralized solution . This
bservation is clearly not a coincidence but is rather rigorously
roved in Theorem 7.1 . On the other hand, the results show that
overing 
∫ T 
0 α
 c SD u SC (t ) d t of the supplier development costs is not
lways economically reasonable from the manufacturer’s point of
iew. In other words, even though direct supplier development
ith a constant cost allocation factor α leads to a signiﬁcant im-
rovement of the overall supply chain proﬁt in comparison with
ndirect supplier development ( α = 0 ), i.e., the strict inequality
 
SC (u  
SC 
) > J SC (u  
S 
) holds, the manufacturer’s proﬁt resulting from
ndirect supplier development, i.e., J M (u  
S 
) , might be superior com-
ared to its counterpart resulting from direct supplier develop-
ent, i.e., J M (u  
SC 
) , see the depicted histograms in Figs. 6 and 7 ,
espectively. 
Given the fact, that the mutually agreed collaboration strategy
ust increase the proﬁtability of both ﬁrms, a possible remedy is
ased on the following idea: For t ∈ [0 , t  
S 
) the supplier invests in
upplier development anyway ( λS ( t ) > c SD , α = 0 ) and thus does
ot require further incentives (subsidies). This (simple) ﬁnding is
he basic idea of the negotiation-based coordination algorithm de-
eloped in the subsequent section. Here, the manufacturer gradu-
lly increases the cost allocation factor α in order to ensure an ef-
cient level of direct supplier development (subsidy) so as no ﬁrmupply chain proﬁt (solid line) with respect to the cost allocation factor α. 
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Fig. 6. Comparison of indirect and direct supplier development – supply chain proﬁt. 
Fig. 7. Comparison of indirect and direct supplier development – manufacturer’s proﬁt. 
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c  has a proﬁtable unilateral deviation from the set of system-wide
optimal actions. 
8. Coordinating supplier development 
In this section, we propose a negotiation-based algorithm
that can be employed as a guideline to realize (perfect) sup-
ply chain coordination while both the manufacturer and the
supplier increase their respective proﬁt in each iteration step,
leading to a win–win situation. First, the sequence of events is
described. Thereafter, the steps performed by the supplier and the
manufacturer in each iteration are presented in more detail. 
Starting from α = 0 , both S and M solve their optimal control
problem to determine t  
S 
and t  
M 
, respectively. Note that for α = 0 ,
0 ≤ t  
S 
< t  
M 
= T is ensured in view of Assumption 5.1 . Hence, both
ﬁrms collaborate until time t  S = min { t  S , t  M } , i.e., they realize the
outcome of the decentralized optimization corresponding to indi-
rect supplier development, see Section 6 . Next, based on the sen-
sitivity information available from the adjoint and its derivative,
M determines an adapted (increased) α-value. This newly set cost
allocation factor holds for all supplier development costs from t  
S 
onwards, i.e., M offers to increase the amount of effort invested
in supplier development from t  S onwards to extend the collabora-
tion. Then, the negotiation process starts again, resulting in a pro-
longed collaboration phase and thus increasing overall proﬁt. With
this overview in mind, we now present the coordination process in
detail. .1. A negotiation-based algorithm 
The proposed algorithm consists of the following six steps,
hich are repeated until a stopping criterion is satisﬁed. Each
teration step causes some additional expenses (negotiation costs),
enoted by Ξ > 0 . Moreover, the following (technical) condition
s needed in order to ensure proper functioning of the proposed
lgorithm. 
ssumption 8.1. Let t¯ ∈ [0 , t  ) be the optimal switching time
esulting from indirect supplier development, see Section 6 .
oreover, let the optimal switching time of the centralized solu-
ion and the corresponding manufacturer’s adjoint be denoted by
 
 and λ M , respectively. Then, suppose that λ
 
M is strictly convex on
 ¯t , t  ) . 
emark 8.1. The manufacturer’s adjoint λ 
M 
is twice (inﬁnitely
any times) continuously differentiable on [0 , t  
M 
) . Hence,
ssumption 8.1 is equivalent to strict positivity of λ M on [ ¯t , t 
 ) ,
.e., 
¨  
M (t) = −
mc 0 ω 
2 b 
((1 − m )(a − c M − r)(1 + ωt) −m − c 0 (1 − 2 m )) 
× (1 + ωt) 2 m −2 > 0 . 
his condition is satisﬁed if, and only if, (1 − m )(a − c M − r)(1 +
 ¯t ) −m > c 0 (1 − 2 m ) holds. To this end, checking the inequality
(1 − m )(a − c M − r) > c 0 (1 − 2 m ) suﬃces. 
The algorithm is constructed such that, ignoring negotiation
osts, i.e., Ξ = 0 , the manufacturer’s and the supplier’s proﬁt
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Algorithm 1 Negotiation-based algorithm. 
Initialization : set i = 1 , α0 = 0 , t  0 = 0 , and ˆ t = T . 
(1) Solve the supplier’s optimal control problem 
Maximize 
∫ T 
t  
i −1 
a − c M − (r + c 0 x (t) m ) 
2 b 
· r − (1 − αi −1 ) c SD u S (t) d t 
subject to the constraints ˙ x(t) = u S (t) , u S (t) ∈ [0 , ω] for all t ∈ [ t  i −1 , T ] , and x (t  i −1 ) = 1 + ωt  i −1 to determine the optimal switching 
time t  
S 
. This can be done by solving Eq. (12) with α = αi −1 . Set t  i := min { ˆ t, t  S } . 
(2) Compute the supplier’s revenue Ψ + 
S 
according to 
Ψ + S = 
∫ t  
i 
0 
a − c M − (r + c 0 (1 + ωt) m ) 
2 b 
· r d t + 
∫ T 
t  
i 
a − c M − (r + c 0 (1 + ωt  i ) m ) 
2 b 
· r d t 
= r 
2 b 
(
T · (a − c M − r) − c 0 
(
(1 + ωt  
i 
) m +1 − 1 
ω(m + 1) + (T − t 
 
i )(1 + ωt  i ) m 
))
, 
and Ψ −
S 
= c SD ω ·
∑ i 
k =1 (t 
 
k 
− t  
k −1 )(1 − αk −1 ) , i.e., the supplier’s effort invested in supplier development. Thus, the suppliers’s proﬁt is 
ΨS (i ) = ΨS = Ψ + S − Ψ −S . 
(3) Compute the manufacturer’s revenue Ψ + 
M 
according to 
Ψ + M = 
∫ t  
i 
0 
(a − c M − r − c 0 (1 + ωt) m ) 2 
4 b 
d t + 
∫ T 
t  
i 
(a − c M − r − c 0 (1 + ωt  i ) m ) 2 
4 b 
d t 
= 1 
4 b 
(
t  i (a − c M − r) 2 − 2(a − c M − r) c 0 
(1 + ωt  
i 
) m +1 − 1 
ω(m + 1) + c 
2 
0 
(1 + ωt  
i 
) 2 m +1 − 1 
ω(2 m + 1) 
)
+ (T − t  i ) ·
(a − c M − r − c 0 (1 + ωt  i ) m ) 2 
4 b 
, 
and Ψ −
M 
= c SD ω ·
∑ i 
k =1 (t 
 
k 
− t  
k −1 ) αk −1 , i.e., the manufacturer’s effort invested in supplier development. Thus, the manufacturer’s 
proﬁt is ΨM (i ) = ΨM = Ψ + M − Ψ −M . 
(4) If i > 1 : If one of the following two stopping criteria is satisﬁed, the algorithm is terminated: 
• The incurred negotiation costs Ξ outweigh the manufacturer’s additional proﬁt, i.e., ΨM (i ) − ΨM (i − 1) < Ξ holds. 
• The supplier’s desired collaboration time t  
S 
is larger than its counterpart ˆ t = t  
M 
(αi −1 ) , i.e., t  S ≥ ˆ t . 
(5) Solve the manufacturer’s optimal control problem 
Maximize 
∫ T 
t  
i −1 
(a − c M − r − c 0 x (t) m ) 2 
4 b 
− αi −1 c SD u M (t) d t 
subject to the constraints ˙ x(t) = u M (t) , u M (t) ∈ [0 , ω] for all t ∈ [ t  i −1 , T ] , and x (t  i −1 ) = 1 + ωt  i −1 to determine the optimal switching 
time t  
M 
. This can be done by solving Eq. (15) with α = αi −1 . Then, evaluate the manufacturer’s adjoint λM (·) = λM (·; t  M ) and its 
derivative ˙ λM (·) at t  i according to Eqs. (14) and (13) , respectively, to compute 
ˆ t = t  i + 
αi −1 c SD − λM (t  i ) 
˙ λM (t  i ) 
(17) 
and αi by plugging ˆ t into Eq. (15) instead of t 
 
M 
and solving this equation for α, i.e., 
αi := 
mc 0 (1 + ω ˆ t ) m −1 · (a − c M − r − c 0 (1 + ω ˆ t ) m ) 
2 bc SD 
· ( ˆ t − T ) . 
(6) Increment the iteration counter i , i.e., i = i + 1 and go to Step (1). 
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λ  ncrease in each iteration as shown in the corollary of the follow-
ng preparatory lemma. 
emma 8.1. Let t  denote the optimal collaboration time of the cen-
ralized solution. Suppose that indirect supplier development results in
 collaboration time t¯ > 0 , see Section 6 , and let Assumption 8.1 hold.
hen, Algorithm 1 yields a strictly increasing sequence of collabora-
ion times t  
i 
, i = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . , which is bounded by t  . Moreover, the
equence αi , i = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . , of cost allocation factors is also strictly
ncreasing. 
roof. Beforehand, note that t  
S 
< t  
M 
= T holds for cost allocation
actor α0 = 0 in view of conditions (12) and (15) . Hence, t  1 is set
o t  
S 
and ˆ t coincides with t  
M 
. Consequently, the relation 
 
 = min { t  S , t  M } ≤ t  ≤ max { t  S , t  M } (18)i olds for i = 1 as shown in the proof of Theorem 7.1 . In par-
icular, the claimed upper bound for t  1 is guaranteed. Note that
oth inequalities in (18) are strict provided t  
S 
 = t  
M 
. The claimed
onotonicity property t  
i 
> t  
i −1 = 0 is satisﬁed in the ﬁrst iteration
 i = 1 ) by assumption. In addition, the inequality ˆ t − t  
S 
> 0 holds,
hich is preserved during the following iterations until the algo-
ithm is terminated due to the second stopping criterion of Step
4), i.e., it may only be violated after ˆ t and t  
S 
are updated in the
ast iteration of Algorithm 1 . 
The characteristic equation (17) of Step (5) can be rewritten as
M (t 
 
i ) + ˙ λM (t  i )( ˆ t − t  i ) = αi −1 c SD (19)
here the manufacturer’s adjoint λM depends on αi −1 . Hence,
M (t 
 
i 
) minus the right hand side of Eq. (19) is strictly positive. In
424 M. Proch et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 256 (2017) 412–429 
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a  combination with ˙ λM (t 
 
i 
) < 0 this implies that the updated ˆ t satis-
ﬁes ˆ t > t  
i 
. Since t  
M 
> t  
i 
= t  
S 
≥ t  
0 
= t¯ holds, Assumption 8.1 implies
strict convexity of λM on [ ¯t , t 
 
M ) . In combination with the fact that
λM is linear after the switching time t 
 
M 
, the inequality ˆ t < t  
M 
can
be concluded, see, e.g. Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal (1993) . 
Hence, plugging ˆ t into Eq. (15) instead of t  M yields a strictly
larger value for αi . Consequently, the manufacturer’s optimal
switching time t  
M 
strictly decreases (and coincides with ˆ t > t  
i 
)
while S computes a strictly larger optimal switching time t  S > t 
 
i 
in
the successive iteration step. In summary, the claimed monotonic-
ity of t  
i 
and αi is ensured. The boundedness now follows from the
fact that min { t  
S 
, t  
M 
} ≤ t  always holds according to Theorem 7.1 ,
which completes the proof. 
The assumption with respect to indirect supplier development
( ¯t > 0 ) essentially means that the supplier reacts sensitive to
changes in the cost allocation factor α. 
Corollary 8.1. Let the assumptions of Lemma 8.1 hold. Then, ignoring
negotiation costs Ξ, the manufacturer’s and the supplier’s proﬁt in-
crease in each iteration of Algorithm 1 , i.e., the following inequalities
hold 
ΨM (i ) > ΨM (i − 1) and ΨS (i ) > ΨS (i − 1) for i = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . . 
Proof. Here, the successively adaptation of the cost allocation fac-
tor plays a major role. Both, the manufacturer and the supplier
wants to prolong the collaboration until ˆ t = t  M and t  S , respectively,
because their marginal proﬁts (adjoints λM and λS ) outweigh their
marginal costs ( αc SD and (1 − α) c SD ) for the updated and increas-
ing cost allocation factor, cf. Lemma 8.1 . Hence, extending the col-
laboration until min { t  S , t  M } ensures that both entrepreneurs in-
crease their proﬁts, i.e., the assertion follows. 
We emphasize that monotonicity of the sequence αi , i =
0 , 1 , 2 , . . . , is an important property for the applicability of the
proposed algorithm because it corresponds to successively increas-
ing the manufacturer’s share in the supplier development program.
Moreover, the algorithm stops after a ﬁnite (small) number of iter-
ations. 
Proposition 8.1. Let the assumptions of Lemma 8.1 be satisﬁed. Then,
Algorithm 1 stops after a ﬁnite number of steps for negotiation costs
Ξ > 0 . 
Proof. If there exits an index i ∈ N such that t  
i 
= ˆ  t ≤ t  
S 
holds, the
assertion trivially follows in view of the second stopping criterion
formulated in Step (4) of Algorithm 1 . Hence, let us suppose that
 
 
i 
= t  
S 
< ˆ  t holds for all i ∈ N . Then, the manufacturer’s proﬁt ei-
ther increases at least by Ξ or Algorithm 1 stops due to the ﬁrst
stopping criterion. Since the manufacturer’s proﬁt is bounded by
J M ( u ) with u ≡ ω evaluated for α = 0 , Algorithm 1 is terminated
after at most  (J M (u ) − J M (0)) /Ξ < ∞ steps where J M (0) denotes
the manufacturer’s proﬁt without supplier development ( u ≡ 0). In
conclusion, the number of steps is uniformly bounded, which com-
pletes the proof. 
The outcome of Algorithm 1 is at least as good as its counter-
part resulting from indirect supplier development, cf. Section 6 . In
contrast to Section 7.2 , this claim holds from both the supplier’s
and the manufacturer’s perspective. Indeed, the outcome even
converges to the centralized solution, as shown in the following
theorem. 
Theorem 8.1. Let the assumptions of Lemma 8.1 hold. Then, if t  
i 
=
 
 
S 
≤ ˆ t holds for all i ∈ N , the sequence of switching times (t  
i 
) i ∈ N con-
verges to t  for negotiation costs Ξ = 0 . 
Proof. If, by chance, (t  S =) t  i = ˆ  t(= t  M ) holds, the assertion fol-
lows in view of Theorem 7.1 . Hence, the strict inequality t  
i 
< ˆts assumed without loss of generality. Since the sequence (t i ) i ∈ N 0 
s strictly increasing and has the upper bound t  according to
emma 8.1 , it converges to ˜ t, ˜ t ≤ t  , for i → ∞ . Now, the asser-
ion can be shown by contradiction. To this end, we show that the
tep size cannot be arbitrarily small if the switching times t i are
ounded away from t  . 
Suppose that ˜ t < t  holds. The one-to-one correspondence be-
ween switching time and cost allocation factor for each ﬁrm of
he supply chain, implies the unique existence of a cost allocation
actor ˜ α such that ˜ t = t  
S 
( ˜  α) holds. For this cost allocation factor
˜ , the algorithm determines ˆ t such that Eq. (19) holds. Here, ex-
stence of (a suﬃciently small) ε > 0 such that ˜ t 
M 
− ε ≥ ˆ t ≥ ˜ t + ε
olds is directly implied by the proof of Lemma 8.1 . 
Since all considered expressions (in particular the adjoint λM as
ell as its derivative) are (uniformly) continuous with respective
o their arguments and parameters, there exists a suﬃciently small
> 0 such that ˜ t 
M 
− ε/ 2 ≥ ˆ t ≥ ˜ t + ε/ 2 holds for all t i ∈ [ ˜ t − δ, ˜  t] .
ence, the resulting change from αi −1 to αi can also be uniformly
stimated ensuring t i +1 > ˜  t . Since ˜ t is the limit, the sequence t i en-
ers the set [ ˜ t − δ, ˜  t] for suﬃciently large iteration index i  , which
eads to a contradiction to our assumption ˜ t < t  . In conclusion, t i 
 t  for i approaching inﬁnity. 
We like to point out that the additional assumption t  
i 
= t  S ≤ tˆ
or all i ∈ N is only incorporated to ensure monotonicity of the
equence (αi ) i ∈ N 0 and thus to simplify Algorithm 1 , which is
referable from the application’s point of view. Details on the re-
uired modiﬁcations of the algorithm without this assumption are
iven in Appendix A . Moreover, Eq. (19) resembles the iteration of
ewton’s method. However, besides the fact that both the function
M and its derivative ˙ λM are updated in each iteration, also t 
 
i 
is
etermined by the supplier’s switching condition (11) . Hence, the
nalysis of the proposed algorithm requires substantially different
rguments. 
In conclusion, the supply chain proﬁt ΨM (i ) + ΨS (i ) converges
o its counterpart corresponding to the centralized solution ; even
hough the proﬁt is distributed differently in comparison to the ap-
roach pursued in Section 7 . Indeed, the distance t  − t i (degree of
uboptimality) tends to zero for Ξ → 0 , i.e., the algorithm yields a
ear-optimal solution . 
.2. Numerical analysis and managerial insights part II 
The core of the proposed algorithm is the adaptation of the
ost allocation factor α in Step (5). At this point, the manufacturer
olves an optimal control problem to obtain sensitivity information
rom the adjoint variable λM ( ·), i.e., the value of further invest-
ents in supplier development, and its derivative ˙ λM (·) and then
ets αi based on these data, see Fig. 8 for an illustration. 
Mathematically speaking, M ﬁrst determines an appropriate tˆ
y calculating the point of intersection of λM (t 
 
i 
) + ˙ λM (t  i )(t − t  i )
nd αi −1 c SD , cf. the black circle. Then, M computes αi by solving
he equation λM ( ˆ t) = αi c SD , cf. the red square. This procedure is
epeated until the manufacturer’s additional proﬁt is less than the
egotiation costs Ξ . 
We performed the ﬁrst six iterations of the coordination algo-
ithm for the basic scenario to illustrate the adaption of the α-
alue. The results show gradual adaption at each iteration and are
isted in Table 2 . The algorithm will stop if ΨM (i ) − ΨM (i − 1) < Ξ
olds, cf. Step (4). Thus, assuming negotiation costs of 5,0 0 0, the
egotiation-based coordination ends with iteration 6 and can be
nterpreted as follows: For t ∈ [0, 2.76), S must cover all supplier
evelopment costs. For t ∈ [2.76, 4.815), M supports S by sub-
idizing a share of 40 . 32 percent of the investment costs. Simi-
arly, for t ∈ [4.815, 6.625), t ∈ [6.625, 7.462), t ∈ [7.462, 7.898)
nd t ∈ [7.898, 8.162), M supports S by subsidizing a share of
M. Proch et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 256 (2017) 412–429 425 
Fig. 8. Illustration of the manufacturer’s approach showing the determination of the cost allocation factor αi . (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure, the 
reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
Fig. 9. Illustration of the manufacturer’s total amount of subsidy in the case of gradual adaption of the cost allocation factor αi −1 (gray-colored area) and the additional 
savings (red-colored area) compared to the corresponding amount of subsidy in the case of a constant cost allocation factor α . (For interpretation of the references to color 
in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
Table 2 
Numerical results of the ﬁrst six iterations of the proposed algorithm. 
i t  M t 
 t  S αi −1 ΨM (i ) ΨS (i ) 
1 60 .0 0 0 9 .212 2 .760 0 .0 0 0 0 1,111,023 .18 947,398 .01 
2 15 .459 9 .212 4 .815 0 .4032 1,335,958 .88 982,524 .83 
3 11 .326 9 .212 6 .625 0 .5715 1,428,934 .82 996,313 .32 
4 10 .406 9 .212 7 .462 0 .6239 1,452,416 .18 998,424 .42 
5 10 .037 9 .212 7 .898 0 .6471 1,460,660 .49 998,920 .16 
6 9 .841 9 .212 8 .162 0 .6599 1,464,420 .04 999,088 .17 
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p  7 . 15 percent, 62 . 39 percent, 64 . 71 percent, and 65 . 99 percent,
espectively. In this manner M and S collaborate until time t ∗
6 
=
 . 162 , resulting in a proﬁt increase of 31 . 81 percent for M and 5 . 46
ercent for S in comparison to indirect supplier development, i.e.,
= 0 . 
As illustrated in Fig. 9 , in the case of gradual adaption of
he cost allocation factor αi −1 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, the
anufacturer’s subsidy is given by 
∫ t i 
0 
αi −1 c SD u SC (t ) d t , cf. the
ray-colored area, resulting in cumulative investment costs of
84,154.45. By contrast, in the case of a constant cost allocation
actor α , cf. Section 7 , the corresponding amount of subsidy is
iven by 
∫ t i 
0 
α c SD u SC (t )˜ d t with α
 = 0 . 7024 , resulting in substan-
ially higher cumulative investment costs of 573,298.88. Thus, by
radually increasing the share of investment costs, the manufac-
uring ﬁrm can realize additional savings of 289,144.43, cf. the red-
olored area. Neglecting negotiation costs, i.e., Ξ = 0 , we also performed the
rst six iterations of the proposed algorithm for all 2,401 instances
f the parameter set considered in Section 7 . We then compare the
ndividual ﬁrms’ proﬁts resulting from gradual adaption of the cost
llocation factor αi −1 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with the correspond-
ng proﬁts resulting from indirect supplier development ( α = 0 ).
he depicted histogram in Fig. 10 shows that for all computed in-
tances, the manufacturer’s proﬁt increase ratios are positive. The
rithmetic mean of the ratios is 31 . 14 percent, with a standard de-
iation of 5 . 96 percent and a median of 30 . 46 percent. Although
he supplier’s average-proﬁt increase ratio of 5 . 74 percent (with a
tandard deviation of 2 . 40 percent and a median of 5 . 33 ) percent
s substantially lower, the ratios are strictly positive for all 2401
nstances. 
In conclusion, at each iteration step, both the supplier and the
anufacturer increase their proﬁt by collaborating until time t ∗
i 
.
ecause neither the supplier nor the manufacturer has a proﬁtable
nilateral deviation from the set of system-wide optimal actions,
he proposed coordination scheme always leads to a win–win
ituation. 
.3. Model extension: multiple suppliers 
In the previous sections, we dealt with the coordination of sup-
lier development, considering a decentralized supply chain with
426 M. Proch et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 256 (2017) 412–429 
Fig. 10. Comparison of indirect and direct supplier development in the case of gradual adaption of the cost allocation factor αi −1 – manufacturer’s proﬁt. 
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A  a single manufacturer and a single supplier. However, the manu-
facturing ﬁrm may want to initiate supplier development programs
with more than just one supplier. Given limited resources available,
the allocation of supplier development investments among multi-
ple suppliers is a critical issue from the manufacturer’s point of
view ( Talluri et al., 2010 ). We brieﬂy sketch an extension showing
that the presented approach can be exploited in order to deal with
this scenario. 
The model extension is based on three key aspects of invest-
ments in supplier development: First, the manufacturer has a lim-
ited budget (resources) for supplier development effort s. Second,
returns in terms of cost savings differ among suppliers depending,
inter alia, on their current performance level c 0 and their learn-
ing rate m , i.e., the suppliers’ innovation capabilities and compe-
tence. Thus, returns from supplier development investments vary.
Third, the manufacturer’s goal is to optimally allocate the budget
(resources) among multiple suppliers so as to maximize return on
investment. 
Because the manufacturer is able to assess the value of further
investments in supplier development by means of adjoint (14) , we
recommend the optimal allocation of supplier development invest-
ments by considering the manufacturer’s adjoint and the respec-
tive investment costs (manufacturer’s subsidy). Let us assume that
s ∈ N ≥2 suppliers are worthy of consideration for supplier develop-
ment and let the manufacturer’s adjoint and share of investment
costs with respect to the n th supplier be denoted by λn 
M 
: [0 , T ] →
R and αn 
i −1 c 
n 
SD 
, for all n ∈ { 1 , 2 , . . . , s } , respectively. 
Setting the initial collaboration time t  
0 ,n 
= 0 , and the initial
cost allocation factor αn 
0 
= 0 , both the suppliers and the manu-
facturer solve their optimal control problems to determine the in-
dividual ﬁrms’ switching times. Clearly, indirect supplier develop-
ment ( αn 
0 
= 0 ) is always welcome from the manufacturer’s point of
view since all costs are covered by the respective supplier resulting
in the (mutually agreed) switching time t  
1 ,n 
according to the n -th
supplier’s switching condition (12) with α = αn 
0 
. 
Then, the manufacturer selects supplier n (supplier develop-
ment initiative) with the highest value according to λn 
M 
(t  
1 ,n 
) −
αn 
0 
c n 
SD 
and performs one iteration of the negotiation-based co-
ordination algorithm for the selected supplier as presented in
Section 8 . This procedure is repeated until the manufacturer’s (lim-
ited) resources are completely allocated or the incurred negotiation
costs outweighs the manufacturer’s additional proﬁt, i.e., Ξ n >
Ψ n 
M 
(i ) − Ψ n 
M 
(i − 1) , for all n ∈ { 1 , 2 , . . . , s } . 
Based on the parameter values of the basic scenario, cf. Table 1 ,
we performed the ﬁrst six steps of the proposed approach for a
setting with two suppliers to make the basic idea more compre-
d  ensible. Both suppliers S 1 and S 2 differ in terms of their individual
earning rate, i.e., m 1 = −0 . 1 and m 2 = −0 . 13 , and the respective
upplier development costs, i.e., c 1 SD = 10 0 , 0 0 0 and c 2 SD = 70 , 0 0 0 .
he results show the optimal allocation of the manufacturer’s re-
ources and are listed in Table 3 . Neglecting negotiation costs, i.e.,
= 0 , and assuming a manufacturer’s budget for supplier devel-
pment of 50 0 , 0 0 0 , the allocation process ends with Step IV and
an be interpreted as follows: In Step I, the manufacturer selects
upplier S 2 and performs one iteration of the negotiation-based co-
rdination algorithm resulting in the (mutually agreed) switching
ime t  
2 , 2 
= 10 . 14 and cumulative investment costs of 193,561.71.
hen, in Steps II and III, M selects supplier S 1 for direct supplier
evelopment resulting in the (mutually agreed) switching time
 
 
2 , 1 
= 4 . 82 and t  
3 , 1 
= 6 . 63 , respectively, and cumulative investment
osts of 379,462.37. Finally, in Step IV, M selects supplier S 2 . How-
ver, with 120,537.63 of budget left for direct supplier develop-
ent, the collaboration is prematurely stopped before t  3 , 2 = 13 . 02
s reached. 
Hence, a model extension for assisting the manufacturing ﬁrm
n making resource allocation decisions in supplier development
nitiatives is possible albeit a detailed study is left for future re-
earch. 
. Conclusions 
This paper addresses the problem of coordinating supplier
evelopment in a decentralized supply chain. In particular, we
xamine the manufacturers problem of incentivizing suppliers
o participate in manufacturer-initiated supplier development
ctivities and provide an innovative application to coordinate the
utual decision to invest in supplier development. At this, we
ocus on one of the most important aspects of successful supplier
evelopment, namely, the allocation of costs and additional proﬁts
etween supply chain partners. 
To this end, we formulate and solve a continuous time optimal
ontrol model characterizing the decision to invest in supplier
evelopment. The detailed analysis of this model indicates that
n the case of indirect supplier development, the optimum in-
estment level, i.e., the centralized solution , is not achieved due to
he supplier’s tendency to underinvest in supplier development.
he manufacturing ﬁrm can induce the centralized solution and
ntensify supplier’s participation by subsidizing a share of the
nvestment costs. Thus, direct supplier development provides a
iable incentive instrument to induce desirable supplier behavior.
lthough the ﬁndings of our analysis indicate that direct supplier
evelopment leads to a signiﬁcant improvement of supply chain
M. Proch et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 256 (2017) 412–429 427 
Table 3 
Numerical results of the ﬁrst six steps of the proposed approach for a setting with two suppliers. 
Supplier 1 ( m = −0 . 1 ; c SD = 10 0 , 0 0 0 ) Supplier 2 ( m = −0 . 13 ; c SD = 70 , 0 0 0 ) 
i t  
i, 1 
α1 
i –1 
 subsidy λ1 M (t 
 
i ,1 
)−α1 
i –1 
c 1 SD λ
2 
M (t 
 
i ,2 
)−α2 
i –1 
c 2 SD  subsidy α
2 
i –1 
t  
i, 2 
i 
I 1 2 .76 0 .0 0 0 0 .00 40,534 .21 < 47,333 .50 0 .00 0 .0 0 0 5 .06 1 
II 1 2 .76 0 .0 0 0 0 .00 40,534 .21 > 13,552 .35 193,561 .71 0 .544 10 .14 2 
III 2 4 .82 0 .403 83,061 .26 14,602 .19 > 13,552 .35 193,561 .71 0 .544 10 .14 2 
IV 3 6 .63 0 .572 185,900 .66 6,766 .40 < 13,552 .35 193,561 .71 0 .544 10 .14 2 
V 3 6 .63 0 .572 185,900 .66 6,766 .40 > 5,500 .85 328,404 .85 0 .669 13 .02 3 
VI 4 7 .46 0 .624 238,306 .58 4,190 .45 < 5,500 .85 328,404 .85 0 .669 13 .02 3 
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Algorithm 2 Modiﬁed algorithm without Steps (2), (3), and (6) of 
Algorithm 1 . 
Initialization : set i = 1 , α0 = 0 , and t  0 = 0 . 
(1a) Solve the supplier’s optimal control problem 
Maximize 
∫ T 
t  
i −1 
a − c M − (r + c 0 x (t) m ) 
2 b 
· r 
− (1 − αi −1 ) c SD u S (t) d t 
subject to ˙ x(t) = u S (t) , u S (t) ∈ [0 , ω] for t ∈ [ t  i −1 , T ] , and 
x (t  
i −1 ) = 1 + ωt  i −1 to determine the optimal switching time 
t  
S 
. 
(1b) Solve the manufacturer’s optimal control problem 
Maximize 
∫ T 
t  
i −1 
(a − c M − r − c 0 x (t) m ) 2 
4 b 
− αi −1 c SD u M (t) d t 
subject to ˙ x(t) = u M (t) , u M (t) ∈ [0 , ω] for t ∈ [ t  i −1 , T ] , and 
x (t  
i −1 ) = 1 + ωt  i −1 to determine the optimal switching time 
t  M . 
(1c) Set t  
i 
:= min { t  
S 
, t  
M 
} . If t  
S 
= t  
M 
holds, stop algorithm after 
Step (4). 
(4) If i > 1 : If the following stopping criterion is satisﬁed, the 
algorithm is terminated: 
• The manufacturer’s additional proﬁt outweighs the in- 
curred negotiation costs Ξ , i.e., ΨM (i ) − ΨM (i − 1) < Ξ
holds. 
(5) If t  S < t 
 
M , set P = M. Otherwise deﬁne P := S. Then, evaluate 
the adjoint λP (·) = λP (·; t  P ) and its derivative ˙ λP (·) at t  i to 
compute 
ˆ t = 
{ 
t  
i 
+ αi −1 c SD −λM (t  i ) 
˙ λM (t  i ) 
if P = M 
t  
i 
+ (1 −αi −1 ) c SD −λS (t  i ) 
˙ λS (t  i ) 
if P = S 
(20) 
and αi by plugging ˆ t into (15) instead of t 
 
M if P = M or into 
(12) instead of t  
S 
if P = S and solving this equation for αi . 
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 roﬁt in comparison with indirect supplier development, subsidiz-
ng a constant share of supplier development costs is not always
conomically reasonable from the manufacturer’s point of view. 
Given the fact that for an ongoing collaborative business rela-
ionship, supply chain coordination must result in enhancing the
roﬁtability of both the supplier and the manufacturer, we intro-
uce a negotiation-based algorithm that assists the manufacturing
rm in gradually increasing the share of investment costs to ensure
n eﬃcient level of direct supplier development. We verify the re-
iability of our application by performing the ﬁrst six iterations of
he proposed algorithm for an extensive parameter set and show
hat for all 2,401 instances a win–win situation is achieved. Thus,
he proposed coordination scheme can be employed as a guideline
o achieve supply chain coordination while both the supplier and
he manufacturer increase their respective proﬁt in each iteration,
esulting in a win–win situation. 
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ppendix A. A technical comment 
As shown in Theorem 8.1 , the outcome of Algorithm 1 con-
erges to the centralized solution, if negotiation costs are ne-
lected, i.e., Ξ = 0 . In addition, the numerical analysis in
ection 8.2 demonstrates that Algorithm 1 can be employed as a
uideline to achieve supply chain coordination for an extensive pa-
ameter set that covers most of the real-life scenarios. However, for
extremely) high learning rates the supplier’s desired collaboration
ime t  S may be larger than its counterpart ˆ t = t  M (αi −1 ) , i.e., t  S ≥ tˆ
nd Algorithm 1 is terminated due to the second stopping criterion
ormulated in Step (4). 
As a motivating example, let us consider the set of parame-
ers given in Table 1 with learning rate m = −0 . 27 . Starting from
= 0 , the ﬁrms solve their respective optimal control problems
esulting in the (mutually agreed) switching time t  1 = t  S ≈ 5 . 61 for
 = 1 . Next, based on the sensitivity information available from the
djoint and its derivative, M determines α1 ≈ 0.8428. Then, both
he supplier and the manufacturer perform the second iteration
f Algorithm 1 resulting in t  S (≈ 20 . 90) and t  M (≈ 19 . 38) , respec-
ively. Note that, the manufacturer’s optimal switching time t  
M 
is
maller than its counterpart on the supplier’s side, i.e., the algo-
ithm is terminated due to the second stopping criterion formu-
ated in Step (4). 
Hence, for a mathematically sound analysis, a modiﬁcation of
lgorithm 1 is necessary in order to prove convergence without
he assumption that t  
i 
= t  
S 
< ˆ  t holds for all i ∈ N . To be more pre-
ise, the roles of the manufacturer M and the supplier S are inter-
hanged if the relation between their respective optimal switching
imes t  and t  is reversed. 
S M Using the modiﬁcations presented in Algorithm 2 , convergence
o the supply chain optimum can be shown analogously to the
roof of Theorem 8.1 . The only change is the (technical) argument
hat the roles of S and M may be exchanged (and, thus, the se-
uence (αi ) i ∈ N may not be monotone). Note that the supplier’s
djoint automatically satisﬁes the convexity assumptions exploited
or λM . 
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